●Focusing on the specific disclosure of voting results in three major Japanese financial groups
Proxy voting, such as board appointment at the general meeting of shareholders, refers to evaluating the investee company’s business performance or the mid- and long-term firm strategy. From the shareholder model standpoint, it also means judging whether the management has managed the company to maximize shareholders’ return, and whether corporate governance has functioned properly.
The Japanese Financial Services Agency requires institutional investors to disclose specific voting records in the Japanese stewardship code revised in May 2017. Moreover, the Government Pension Investment Fund, the largest pension fund globally, expects their investment managers to comply with the stewardship code in the stewardship principles published in June 2017. As a result, Japanese investment managers have started to disclose individual voting results of investee companies, making this investigation possible.
In this report, we analyzed individual voting records of Japanese institutional investors for shareholder proposals which were suggested to three major Japanese financial groups, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (the “Company”-Ticker Code:8306, MUFG), Resona Holdings (8308, Resona), and Mizuho Financial Group (8411, Mizuho), at their annual general meetings of shareholders (AGM) in June 2017.